Every firm that offers investment products has to monitor them for material change, which Canadian rules call significant change. The rules that require it are covered elsewhere in this library. This guide is about how it actually works: the machinery that turns a written policy into a daily check on every product, and a check into an alert that reaches the right person.
That machinery has three parts. Rules say precisely what counts as a change worth looking at. An engine runs every rule against every product on a schedule and records what it found. Alerts carry the result to the people who have to act, at a volume they can actually handle. Each part can fail on its own, and a weakness in any one of them undoes the other two.
This is the second of five guides in the Product series. It follows Product Approval, which covers how products get onto the shelf, and sets out how to write monitoring rules, how a monitoring engine runs, and how to design alerts, with worked examples, responsibilities for the firm and the advisor, and an example written process. The next guide, From Alert to Decision, picks up where an alert is raised.
For the regulatory basis, see Material Change: When to Reopen a KYP Assessment and Canada vs US: KYP Standards Compared. For testing the data behind the engine, see Auditing KYP Monitoring Data.
A policy says "monitor for significant changes." A system needs something much more specific: which number, compared to what, how often, and what happens when it crosses a line. Canadian regulators found that many firms had monitoring in place but no definition of what a significant change was.[1] Writing the rules is how that gap gets closed.
A rule is complete when someone who didn't write it could implement it without asking a question. That takes more fields than most policy documents record.
| Field | What It Specifies | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Rule ID and name | A stable identifier that never changes, even when the rule does | MF-07 Management Fee Increase |
| Scope | Which products the rule applies to | All mutual fund series on the shelf or held |
| Type | Threshold (a number crosses a line) or event (something happens) | Event |
| Metric or event | The exact data field or event being tested | Management fee rate for the series |
| Data source | Where the value comes from, and a fallback | Fund data vendor; fund amendment filings as fallback |
| Comparison basis | What the value is compared to: a fixed level, the product's own history, or a peer group | The series' own prior value |
| Condition | The precise test that constitutes a breach | Current rate is higher than the prior recorded rate |
| Window | The period the metric is measured over, if any | Not applicable |
| Frequency | How often the rule is evaluated | Daily, and on every new filing |
| Severity | The level the alert is raised at | Important |
| Settle window | How long a reviewed breach stays closed before it can alert again, and what reopens it early | Closed until the fee changes again |
| Missing-data behaviour | What happens if the value can't be obtained | Record "could not evaluate" and route to data owner |
| Owner | The person or committee accountable for the rule | Product Committee |
| Version and effective date | So every alert can be tied to the rule in force when it fired | v2.1, effective 2026-07-01 |
Two fields are left out more than any others. Comparison basis decides whether a rule finds products behaving differently from their peers or just catches every market move; see the discussion of relative thresholds in Monitoring for Material Change. Missing-data behaviour decides whether a gap in the data is visible or silently counted as a pass.
The rules below show how threshold and event rules look when written to the specification above. The thresholds are illustrations of the mechanics, not recommended settings; each firm should calibrate its own.
| Rule | Type | Condition | Frequency | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EQ-01 Dividend Cut | Event | Declared dividend per share is lower than the prior declaration | On each declaration | Critical |
| EQ-04 Relative Drawdown | Threshold | Price decline from 12-month high exceeds the sector's decline by more than 20 percentage points | Daily | Watch |
| MF-03 Quartile Drop | Threshold | Three-year peer-category quartile falls by one or more quartiles | Monthly | Important |
| MF-07 Management Fee Increase | Event | Management fee rate for any series increases | Daily and on filings | Important |
| MF-11 Portfolio Manager Change | Event | Named lead portfolio manager changes | Daily and on filings | Critical |
| ETF-02 Tracking Difference | Threshold | Rolling 12-month tracking difference is worse than the category median by more than 0.50% | Monthly | Watch |
| ETF-05 Closure Notice | Event | Issuer announces termination, delisting or merger | Daily | Critical |
| SP-04 Barrier Proximity | Threshold | Worst-performing underlying is within 10% of the barrier level | Daily | Important (Critical within 5%) |
| ALT-02 Audit Overdue | Event | Audited financial statements not received within the period set in firm policy after fiscal year-end | Daily | Critical |
| ALT-05 Redemption Gate | Event | Redemptions suspended, gated or terms changed | Daily and on notices | Critical |
Written out in full, a single rule looks like this:
For the product-specific triggers behind these examples, see the Investment Monitoring guides for equities, mutual funds and ETFs, structured products, segregated funds and annuities, model portfolios and alternatives and private markets.
The engine is whatever runs the rules - a vendor platform, an in-house system, or in small firms a well-controlled spreadsheet process. Its job is the same regardless: evaluate every rule against every product on schedule, and leave a record that it did.
Step 1 decides what the engine can see: a product missing from the population is never evaluated at all. Step 3 decides whether the engine can be trusted; see Auditing KYP Monitoring Data. Step 8 is what turns monitoring into evidence. Canadian regulators found firms that had current information on file but no evidence it was reviewed,[1] and expect firms that use automated systems for KYP to describe those processes in detail in their written policies.[1]
A simple engine records "breach" or "no breach." That isn't enough. Every evaluation should end in one of four states, each recorded:
| State | Meaning | What Happens Next |
|---|---|---|
| Breached | The rule's condition was met | An alert is opened, escalated or grouped |
| Cleared | The rule ran on valid data and the condition was not met | Recorded as evidence the product was checked |
| Suppressed | The condition was met, but a reviewed alert is inside its settle window | Recorded, not re-alerted; reopens if the break-through condition is met |
| Could not evaluate | Data was missing, stale or invalid | Routed to the data owner as its own exception |
The fourth state matters most. An engine that quietly treats "could not evaluate" as "cleared" will report a clean shelf precisely when it knows least.
| Consideration | Questions to Ask |
|---|---|
| Coverage | Does it cover every product type the firm offers and holds, including alternatives, structured notes and transfers-in? |
| Rule flexibility | Can the firm write its own rules, with its own thresholds, comparison bases and severities, and version them? |
| Event detection | Does it detect events from filings and notices, or only thresholds from market data? |
| Evaluation states | Does it record cleared, suppressed and could-not-evaluate outcomes, not just breaches? |
| Reproducibility | Can it show what data and rule version produced any past result? |
| Workflow | Does it route alerts and record the review and decision, or only raise them? |
| Advisor view | Can advisors see alerts for the products they deal in, and record their response? |
| Oversight | Can the firm evidence that the system is functioning appropriately, and is the vendor subject to the firm's vendor oversight? |
Whichever route is chosen, the firm remains responsible for the result. A vendor's platform can run the rules; it can't own the definition of what a significant change is for the firm's shelf.
An alert is the point where the machine hands over to people. Designed well, it tells the right person exactly what changed and what they need to do. Designed badly, it becomes noise that everyone learns to clear without reading.
| Field | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Alert ID and status | Unique reference; open, in review, closed or reopened |
| Product | Name, identifier, category and current shelf status |
| Rule and version | Which rule fired, in which version |
| What changed | The value before and after, or the event, with the date detected |
| Source | The data or document that met the condition, with a link |
| Severity | Critical, Important or Watch, and why |
| Exposure | How many advisors and accounts hold the product, and the total amount held |
| Required action and due date | What the recipient must do, and by when, set by severity |
| History | Previous alerts on the same product and rule, and how they were resolved |
The last field is the one most often missing. A reviewer who can see that the same fund breached the same rule twice last year, and why each was closed, makes a better decision in less time.
Severity should be defined by the response it requires, and routing should follow from severity. The matrix below uses the Critical, Important and Watch levels from The Continuous KYP Playbook: Who Does What. Timeframes are illustrative.
| Severity | Goes To | Required Response | Illustrative Timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Product committee; every advisor holding or offering the product; supervision | Product review and a recorded decision; advisors informed of the outcome | Review opened within 1 business day; decision within 5 |
| Important | Product owner; advisors holding or offering the product | Documented assessment of the change; escalation if warranted | Assessment within 10 business days |
| Watch | Product owner | Noted and tracked; reviewed together at the next scheduled product review | By next scheduled review |
| Could not evaluate | Data owner | Fix the data or document why it can't be obtained | Within 3 business days |
Each technique has a risk: grouping can hide a second problem, and settle windows can hold a worsening situation closed. The controls are the same for all four - write the logic down, record every suppressed result, and define the break-through conditions that reopen an alert immediately. A useful health check is the share of alerts closed with no action: if it's very high, the rules need recalibrating, not the reviewers.